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INTRODUCTION
Following the phenomenon before the U.S. Supreme Court,
many Christian advocacy groups and churches have increased
their presence before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR). The advocacy groups can adopt a form of nongovernmental organizations (NGO), a conference of churches,1 or
* Dr. Hab. Eugenia Relaño Pastor, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Law &
Anthropology, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle (Saale) Germany,
pastor@eth.mpg.de.
1. See, e.g., Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 183 (summarizing
the arguments presented in the third-party intervener brief of the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of England and Wales); Martínez v. Spain, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 449, 474–75
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even an appointed academic scholar as a representative of the
church or as an independent neutral actor.2 As third-party
interveners, these actors argue that to ensure more authentic and
more legitimate judicial decision-making, additional voices beyond
those of the parties should be heard by the court. The nature of
intervention shifts from an invitation by the court to an application
to the court; from official or statutory bodies such as governments3
to lobbying groups;4 and from neutral submissions to “rather more
partisan arguments.”5
The so-called public interest intervention has been justified by
scholars on two grounds: first, that intervention places a diversity
of information, beyond that provided by the parties, before the
court; and second, that intervention enhances the legitimacy of the
eventual decision.6 Regarding the first point, we shall explore how
much diverse information Christian advocacy groups effectively
add to the cases for the ECtHR. As for legitimacy, the value of
legitimation of the decision rendered by the court relies on the fair
chance for different actors to “play the game.” As Bryden points
out, “judicial decisions create winners and losers. And nobody likes
to lose.”7 By enhancing opportunities for public participation and
showing courts’ willingness to listen to interveners, judges attach
importance to people. Bryden also argues that public participation
is relevant “not only from the belief that we improve the accuracy
of decisions when we allow people to present their side of the story,
but also from our sense that participation is necessary to preserve
human dignity and self-respect.”8 This argument will also be
explored here by querying whether Christian advocacy groups’
interventions aim to protect human dignity by providing a voice
(summarizing the arguments presented in the third-party intervener brief of the Spanish
Episcopal Conference (Conferencia Episcopal Española)).
2. See, e.g., Oral Submission of Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler on Behalf of Armenia et
al. as Third-Party Intervening States, Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61,
https://eclj.org/pdf/weiler_lautsi_third_parties_submission_by_jhh_weiler.pdf; Avidan
Kent & Jamie Trinidad, International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae: An Emerging Dialogue (of the
Deaf)?, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 1081 (2016).
3. See, e.g., Lautsi, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 85–87 (discussing government
interveners’ arguments).
4. See, e.g., Martínez, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 475 (discussing the European Centre for
Law and Justice’s arguments).
5. Sarah Hannett, Third Party Intervention: In the Public Interest?, 2003 PUB. L. 128, 128.
6. Philip L. Bryden, Public Interest Intervention in the Court, 66 CAN. B. REV. 490 (1987).
7. Id. at 508.
8. Id. at 509.
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for disadvantaged groups who have historically been ineffective in
influencing public policy or, on the contrary, if their intervention
contributes to judicial decision-making in one particular direction
according to an overall campaign strategy for their own NGOs’
aims, which could be those of the large religious communities.
The first Part of this Article shows how NGOs have become a
driving force in shaping rights by intervening strategically in
relevant litigation at the supranational level. The second Part aims
at analyzing the meaning of the term amicus curiae as well as the
progressive acceptance of NGOs as third-party interveners before
the Strasbourg organs. And the third Part scrutinizes the four main
“religious-oriented” areas in which Christian advocacy groups
have intervened at the ECtHR. By analyzing the forty-four
Strasbourg cases gathered from the Human Rights Documentation
(HUDOC) database, as well as the main Christian advocacy groups’
internet sites, this contribution also hints at how Christian groups’
fundamental philosophical principles—with ramifications in
sensitive ethical issues—could conflict with the evolving
interpretation of the European Convention’s rights asserted by
the Strasbourg Court. Furthermore, the study renders self-evident
that these third-party actors endorse the governments’ arguments,
and therefore the states’ margin of appreciation when their
philosophical and religious principles that inspire their agendas
are at stake.
I. SUPRANATIONAL STRATEGIC LITIGATION: THE ROLE OF NGOS
Supranational litigation opportunities offer interest groups as
NGOs new participation rights and a voice at the supranational
level and, more particularly, at the Council of Europe level. The role
of NGOs in legal mobilization has received substantial attention
among socio-legal scholars.9 Some literature has concentrated on
9. RACHEL A. CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION,
MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNANCE (2007) [hereinafter CICHOWSKI, EUROPEAN COURT AND
CIVIL SOCIETY]; Peter J. Spiro, Nongovernmental Organizations in International Relations
(Theory), in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 223–43 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013);
Rachel A. Cichowski, Legal Mobilization, Transnational Activism, and Gender Equality in the EU,
28 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 209 (2013); Lisa Conant, Andreas Hofmann, Dagmar Soennecken & Lisa
Vanhala, Mobilizing European Law, 25 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1376 (2017); Sophie Jacquot &
Tommaso Vitale, Law as Weapon of the Weak? A Comparative Analysis of Legal Mobilization by
Roma and Women’s Groups at the European Level, 21 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 587 (2014); Lisa Vanhala,
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how unsuccessful groups, unable to exhaust the conventional
political structures, can weaponize and instrumentalize the law as
a strategic tool and provoke transformations of law or policy
reforms from below.10 Other socio-legal scholars have adopted
macro-level analyses of the political and legal opportunity
structures (access to procedures in court) and cost-benefit
calculations for NGO’s’ intervention.11 Another type of socio-legal
research has centered on micro-level elements (organizations’ legal
capacity or prior legal mobilization experience),12 and some other
scholars, such as Anagnostou and Fokas, have analyzed the
effect of the judicial rulings on the mobilization of social actors
and how courts’ decisions can influence the discursive frames
of social movements’ actors, reconstruct their interests, and at
times empower them. As Anagnostou and Fokas highlight,
courts—in a contradictory way in legal action related to religion
and religious freedom—“can contribute to the emergence, growth
or decline of social movements, not only of progressive but also
of conservative ones.”13
Regardless of the angle taken to study the role of NGOs in
strategic litigation, Harlow and Rawlings draw a relevant
distinction between proactive litigation strategies and reactive
litigation strategies that is very useful for our analysis.14 Proactive
litigation describes those situations where groups seek to take their
cause to the courts and promote some policy change through
courts. Reactive litigation would include those situations where

Anti-Discrimination Policy Actors and Their Use of Litigation Strategies: The Influence of Identity
Politics, 16 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 738, 740–45 (2009).
10. Jacquot & Vitale, supra note 9, at 587.
11. Conant et al., supra note 9, at 1382; HELEN DUFFY, STRATEGIC HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION: UNDERSTANDING AND MAXIMISING IMPACT 13–21 (2018).
12. See Muhip Ege Çağlıdil, When NGOs Turn to Strategic Litigation: European
Supranational Courts as Venues to Influence EU Asylum Policy and the Dublin Regulations
(2018) (M.A. thesis, Central European University), http://www.etd.ceu.edu/2018/
caglidil_muhip.pdf.
13. Dia Anagnostou & Effie Fokas, The “Radiating Effects” of the European Court of
Human Rights on Social Mobilisations Around Religion in Europe—An Analytical Frame 7
(Mobilise Grassroots, Working Paper No. 1, 2015), http://grassrootsmobilise.eu/theradiating-effects-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-on-social-mobilisations-aroundreligion-in-europe-an-analytical-frame/.
14. CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, PRESSURE THROUGH LAW (1992) (cited in
Vanhala, supra note 9, at 741).
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groups feel the law was discriminatory and challenge the law to
seek a remedy and acknowledgment by the court.15
At the supranational European level, judicial decisions can be
used by NGOs as leverage to “expand the scope” of rights or “alter
the meaning of treaty provisions—rules that are otherwise relatively
immune to alteration.”16 The type of litigation heavily influences
NGOs’ use of strategic litigation. In 1974, Galanter distinguished
two types of litigation interventions: “repeat players” and “oneshotters.”17 Repeat players have a broader experience by engaging
simultaneously in several complaints, and they have more resources
as well. Repeat player litigants are concerned not only about the
outcome of a particular case but also about the change, or
maintenance, of a specific policy. The very nature of “repeat
playing” ensures an accumulation of experience and skills. Indeed,
Hodson has argued that NGOs litigating before the ECtHR are
mostly repeat players.18 Additionally, repeat players’ intervention
does not always represent those who have traditionally had little
effective voice in society. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, like Canada
and the United Kingdom, strategic litigation also demonstrates that
non-government interveners do not represent the sole interest of the
powerless.19 For example, in the Pretty case in England, a terminally
ill woman suffering from motor neuron disease sought judicial
review of the Director of Public Prosecutions’s decision not to issue
an undertaking not to prosecute her husband if he assisted her in
killing herself.20 The House of Lords allowed interventions from
representatives of the Catholic Church and a consortium of pro-life
groups made up of the Society for the Protection of Unborn
15. A reactive litigation strategy is very important for sub-cultural movement
organizations such as LGBT activism, which involves campaigning for the decriminalization
of homosexual offenses and ﬁghting against the unequal age of consent laws. Individual
activists and small grassroots organizations relied on protest and subsequent “reactive
litigation strategies” as a way of looking inward and developing and reproducing collective
identities. See Vanhala, supra note 9, at 750.
16. CICHOWSKI, EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 9, at 6.
17. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974). Galanter points out that “[w]e might divide our actors
into those claimants who have only occasional recourse to the courts (one-shotters or OS)
and repeat players (RP) who are engaged in many similar litigations over time.” Id.
18. LOVEDAY HODSON, NGOS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE
63–64 (2011).
19. Hannett, supra note 5, at 138.
20. Pretty
v.
Dir.
of
Pub.
Prosecutions
[2001]
UKHL
61,
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd011129/pretty-1.htm.
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Children, the Medical Ethics Alliance, and Alert.21 In this case, the
Christian third-party interveners gave voice to a majority sector of
the population.
Here, I will analyze the role of the Christian faith-based
organizations as repeat players in their intervention at the ECtHR,
and more specifically, the impact of their expertise in expanding
case law and setting precedents for the Strasbourg Court. Churches
and conferences of churches have also intervened as third parties;
however, due to the limited space of this contribution, the
intervention of churches will not be addressed.22
II. AMICUS CURIAE BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Background: NGO Standing Before the ECtHR
There is no single valid definition of NGO.23 NGOs are
distinguished from other common types of organizations,
specifically governmental bodies, enterprises, and informal
entities such as families.24 For this Article, the term will be used
to describe a type of non-state actor that is formally constituted
and non-profit seeking.
When the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
entered into force on September 3, 1953, and the 1950 original
version was read, individuals and private groups, including NGOs,
did not have the right to appear before the ECtHR.25 However,
individuals and groups, including NGOs, could file complaints
with the European Commission of Human Rights, claiming a
violation by one of the member states of his, her, or its rights as set

21. Id.
22. Churches have played a prominent role as third-party interveners in relevant
ECtHR cases. See Schüth v. Germany, 2010-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 422 (summarizing the
Catholic Diocese of Essen’s arguments as third-party intervener); Sindicatul “Păstorul cel
Bun” v. Romania, 2013-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 59–60 (summarizing the arguments of third-party
interveners, the Archdiocese of Craiova and the Moscow Patriarchate).
23. See Stephan Hobe, Non-Governmental Organizations, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anne Peters & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2019),
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e968?rskey=ICvYvG&result=3&prd=MPIL.
24. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights Courts
and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911, 911 (2011).
25. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 25, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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forth in the European Convention. Over time, the President of the
ECtHR could grant the opportunity to intervene to both individuals
and NGOs if, in a given case, it would be in the interest of the
proper administration of justice. Before 1998, it appears NGOs
participated in only several dozen cases in total.26 When Protocol
11 went into effect in 1998, it eliminated the European Commission
and expanded the entities that had a right to bring a case before the
ECtHR. More specifically, Protocol 11 amended Article 34 of the
European Convention to provide that “[t]he Court may receive
applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one
of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the
Convention or the protocols thereto.”27 Protocol 11 also amended
Article 36 of the ECHR that under the heading Third-party
intervention to state, “The President of the Court may, in the interest
of the proper administration of justice, invite any High Contracting
Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person
concerned who is not the applicant to submit written comments or
take part in hearings.”28
Nevertheless, the right for an NGO to act as a claimant before
the ECtHR has been restricted. The NGO must have a claim that it
has been the victim of a violation by a member state of the rights
set forth in the European Convention, and it is not sufficient
that the rights of the group of individuals which the NGO
represents have been violated. Consequently, as Laura Van den
Eynde points out, since NGOs do not have locus standi before the
ECtHR to act on behalf of alleged victims within their field
of competence, third-party interventions have effectively become
one of the few available avenues for NGOs to become involved
in cases before the Court.29
B. Third-Party Intervention and Amicus Curiae Briefs
The literal translation of the Latin term amicus curiae as “a friend
of the court” often causes confusion as to its present nature, scope,

26. Mayer, supra note 24, at 916.
27. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 34, May 11, 1994, C.E.T.S. No. 155.
28. Id. art. 36.
29. Laura Van den Eynde, An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human
Rights NGOs Before the European Court of Human Rights, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271, 276 (2013).
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and origins.30 In 1964, Ernest Angell provided a definition by which
amicus appears “to have been originally a bystander who, without
any direct interest in the litigation, intervened on his own initiative
to make a suggestion to the court on matters of fact and law within
his own knowledge: the death of a party, manifest error, collusion,
etc.”31 From this definition can be drawn that the amicus assists the
court on the law and on the facts. As a non-party intervener
“without having an interest in the cause,”32 independence and
neutrality are assumed. The assistance provided to the court relies
on the amicus’s expertise and the ability to assist the court with
research, arguments, and submissions. An amicus can even correct
the court when a judge is doubtful or mistaken.33 Chandra Mohan
classifies the amicus curiae into four categories for a better
understanding of its historical development:
1. The Classic or Traditional Amicus: The amicus is normally
appointed if the court considers that a case involves
important questions of law of public interest. The
purpose of the amicus is to advise or assist the court in
arriving at its decision and not to represent the interests
of any party or cause.
2. The Bystander or Intervening Good Samaritan: The amicus
is as a bystander-intervener that offers factual or legal
information to the court.
3. The Supportive Amicus: This category can be subdivided
into three categories: (a) the amicus appointed by the
court to present the case on behalf of an undefended
party; (b) the amicus as a third party with a “personal
and direct interest in one of the parties in the case”;34
and (c) government officers permitted to appear as
amicus on behalf of a wider public interest to inform the
court about public policy issues.
30. See S. Chandra Mohan, The Amicus Curiae: Friends No More?, 2010 SING. J. LEGAL
STUD. 352, 353, 357.
31. Ernest Angell, The Amicus Curiae American Development of English Institutions, 16
INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 1017, 1017 (1967).
32. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE
L.J. 694, 694 (1963) (quoting 1 BENJ. VAUGHAN ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES
USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 62 (1879)).
33. Kent & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 1084.
34. Mohan, supra note 30, at 369.
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4. The Political or Modern Amicus: The amicus often has a
strong interest in the outcome and represents an interest
group or organization with a social or political agenda.35
Considering this classification, Chandra Mohan raises a pertinent
question: Is the amicus a friend of the court or to the court? This
question goes beyond semantics. A friend of the court assists by
providing information so that the court will not fall into error, and
a friend to the court attempts to persuade the court to adopt a
particular point of view or the outcome.36
As previously noted, NGOs can be involved in cases before the
ECtHR as third-party interveners. This possibility appeared on
January 1, 1983, when the Revised Rules of Court came into force
and Rule 37(2) stated that:
The President may, in the interest of the proper administration of
justice, invite or grant leave to any Contracting State which is not
a Party to the proceedings to submit written comments within a
time-limit and on issues which he shall specify. He may extend
such an invitation or grant such leave to any person concerned
other than the applicant.37

The first successful intervention of a third party under this Rule
was made by the Post Office Engineering Union with the help of an
NGO, namely INTERIGHTS, in Malone v. United Kingdom.38
INTERIGHTS, jointly with the British NGO ARTICLE 19, also
unsuccessfully intervened in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria,39 a
case challenging the Austrian blasphemy law, and offered support
to the European Commission to consider the necessity of laws that
ban expression which ridiculed or was offensive to a particular
religion or religious belief.40 In Otto-Preminger, the third-party
intervention was supported by declarations from nine freedom of

35. Id. at 365–72.
36. Id. at 369.
37. Revised Rules of Court, Eur. Ct. H.R., R. 37(2) (Nov. 24, 1982),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_1982_RoC_Revised_Nouveau_BIL.PDF.
38. Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, 16 (1985).
39. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep.
34, 37 (1994).
40. See generally id.
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expression professors and lawyers of ten European countries and
the United States.41
Today, the European Court has a well-established and
important system for intervention in cases by third parties
regulated by Article 36 of ECHR and Article 44 of the Rules of the
Court.42 According to Rule 44 section 3(a):
[T]he President of the Chamber may, in the interests of the proper
administration of justice, as provided in Article 36 § 2 of the
Convention, invite, or grant leave to, any Contracting Party which
is not a party to the proceedings, or any person concerned who is
not the applicant, to submit written comments or, in exceptional
cases, to take part in a hearing. 43

Further, “the President may decide not to include the comments in
the case file or to limit participation in the hearing to the extent that
he or she considers appropriate.”44 A third party can also seek to
provide written comments that “shall be forwarded by the
Registrar to the parties to the case, who shall be entitled, subject to
any conditions, including time-limits, set by the President of the
Chamber, to file written observations in reply or, where
appropriate, to reply at the hearing.”45 All the provisions under
Rule 44 apply as well to the proceedings before the Grand Chamber
constituted to deliver advisory opinions under Article 2 of Protocol

41. Marek Antoni Nowicki, NGOs Before the European Commission and the Court of
Human Rights, 14 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 289, 298 (1996).
42. Rule 44 was amended by the Court on July 7, 2003; November 13, 2006; and
September 19, 2016. Revised Rules of Court, Eur. Ct. H.R., R. 44 n.2 (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/rules_court_eng.pdf.
43. Id. § 3(a); see also id. § 3(b) (“Requests for leave for this purpose must be duly
reasoned and submitted in writing in one of the official languages as provided in Rule 34 § 4
not later than twelve weeks after notice of the application has been given to the respondent
Contracting Party. Another time-limit may be fixed by the President of the Chamber for
exceptional reasons.”).
44. Id. § 5. It is interesting to note that
[i]n cases to be considered by the Grand Chamber, the periods of time . . . shall run
from the notification to the parties of the decision of the Chamber under Rule 72
§ 1 to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber or of the decision of
the panel of the Grand Chamber under Rule 73 § 2 to accept a request by a party
for referral of the case to the Grand Chamber.
Id. § 4(a). According to Rule 44 section 4(b), “[t]he time-limits laid down in this Rule may
exceptionally be extended by the President of the Chamber if sufficient cause is shown.”
Id. § 4(b).
45. Id. § 6.
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No. 16 to the Convention.46 In this latter case, the President of the
Court has the power to determine the time limits which apply to
third-party interveners.
C. Methodology: Data Collection
The amicus briefs submitted to the court have increased since
Protocol 11 came into effect in 1998.47 However, it is difficult to
access the number and the content of the third-party interventions
because they are not listed in any open and comprehensive
database. The only online database that identiﬁes participation by
organization type and modes of participation (direct victim, legal
representative, and amicus/third-party intervention) is the
European Court of Human Rights Database (ECHRdb) run by
Cichowski and Chrun.48 It is not an open database, although some
key information can be found in the opening remarks on the
ECHRdb internet site: from 1960 until 2014, a total of 15,147
judgments have been delivered and 1,233 amicus briefs have been
filed.49 Therefore, this Article only uses the data extracted from the
HUDOC database (decisions as well as judgments). Unfortunately,
HUDOC does not list in any way the third-party interventions.
Consequently, the way to proceed has been twofold: first, to search
for the keywords in Article 36(2)—the current article allowing
third-party interventions—and Article 37(2)—the article related to
third-party interventions before the entry in force of Protocol 11;
and second, from the results thus obtained, to search for the most
well-known Christian advocacy groups as keywords (like the
European Centre for Law and Justice, ADF International, Alliance
Defending, and Movimento per la Vita).
However, using only the HUDOC database is precarious due to
the deficiency in the advance search engine provided that reveals
notable imperfections: (1) sometimes the court mentions amici and

46. See Protocol No. 16 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Oct. 2, 2013, C.E.T.S. No. 214.
47. For an illustration of the increase of amicus participation in the court, see Van den
Eynde, supra note 29, at 280.
48. Rachel Cichowski & Elizabeth Chrun, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS. DATABASE,
https://depts.washington.edu/echrdb/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
49. Id. The ECHRdb supposes to make available a set of downloadable data files and
an online analysis tool enabling broad access to the data. However, the ECHRdb Online
Analysis Tool has not yet been implemented at the time of writing, and the access to the
datasets was not possible through the mail contact provided. See id.
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other times “third-party intervener” without specifying who;
(2) occasionally the court does not even mention the participation
of amici; and (3) there is no access to the original written briefs
submitted by the third parties. To complete the information
about potential amici submitted by the advocacy groups
mentioned above, the internet sites of these groups have been
scrutinized, although only some written submissions presented
before the ECtHR are accessible on their websites. Hence,
because the information comes from diverse sources and is not
systematized, the analysis of the interventions of these NGOs
as third parties is incomplete.50
III. CHRISTIAN ADVOCACY GROUPS AS AMICUS CURIAE AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE STRASBOURG COURT
A. Who Are the Most Prominent Christian
NGOs Active Before the Court?
As Van den Eynde notes, the appearance of Christian groups
labeled as “conservative” in the Strasbourg Court is an echo of the
phenomenon observed before the U.S. Supreme Court for at least
three decades.51 The adjective “conservative” speaks for socially
conservative Christian advocacy groups—mainly Catholics and
Evangelicals—who have been actively mobilized in litigation in the
United States in abortion decisions, right-to-die cases, and issues of
religion and education since the 1970s.52 Indeed, United States and
Canada provide the best-developed examples of NGO involvement
in religious litigation and in litigation specifically by religious
groups.53 The study of mobilizations around religion is not
surprising given the fact, as Fokas notices, that religion plays a
more prominent public and political role in North America than in

50. Sometimes the advocacy organization represents the applicant so is not listed as a
third-party intervener. See the intervention of ADF International in Dimitrova v. Bulgaria,
ADF INT’L, https://adfinternational.org/legal/dimitrova-v-bulgaria/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2021); Vitaliy Bak v. Russia, ADF INT’L, https://adfinternational.org/legal/vitaliy-bak-vrussia/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2021); and Altınkaynak v. Turkey, ADF INT’L, https://
adfinternational.org/legal/altinkaynak-and-others-v-turkey/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
51. Van den Eynde, supra note 29, at 287.
52. Dennis R. Hoover & Kevin R. den Dulk, Christian Conservatives Go to Court: Religion
and Legal Mobilization in the United States and Canada, 25 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 9, 11 (2004).
53. See generally Bryden, supra note 6; Hannett, supra note 5; Hoover & den Dulk,
supra note 52, at 21–26.
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the European context.54 Due to the experience of the U.S. Christian
advocacy groups in litigation and the fact that Evangelical
Christians tend to work transnationally more than other
stakeholder groups, the two most influential Christian advocacy
groups at the Strasbourg organs are the European Centre for Law
and Justice (ECLJ) and the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF, also
known as ADF International, and formerly known as Alliance
Defense Fund). Both are originally from the United States.
ADF defines itself “[l]ike the Body of Christ, . . . [a] body made
up of many parts[,]” and for more than 25 years it has been
advocating “for religious liberty, the sanctity of human life,
freedom of speech, and marriage and family.”55 Founded in 1993
by thirty-five Christian leaders who “came together to build a
ministry that “would defend your religious freedom— . . . before it
was too late[,]”56 the founders knew that “it would take an
alliance to keep the doors open for the Gospel in the United
States.”57 One of its main goals is advocacy with an impact
on society. ADF’s website explains, “It is not enough to just win
cases; we must change the culture[.]”58 The transplantation of ADF
to Europe results in a branch of the original U.S. matrix under the
name of ADF International, and it characterizes itself as a “faithbased legal advocacy organization that protects fundamental
freedoms and promotes the inherent dignity of all people.”59
As an advocacy group, it advocates for the sanctity of life, marriage
and family, and religious freedom by “[m]aking a far-reaching
and lasting impact[.]”60
ECLJ defines itself as “an international, Non-Governmental
Organization dedicated to the promotion and protection of human

54. Effie Fokas, Comparative Susceptibility and Differential Effects on the Two European
Courts: A Study of Grasstops Mobilizations Around Religion, 5 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 541, 545
(2016). As Dennis R. Hoover and Kevin R. den Dulk note: “American political culture is
exceptionally litigious and exceptionally religious.” Hoover & den Dulk, supra note 52, at 10.
55. About Us, ALL. DEFENDING FREEDOM, https://www.adflegal.org/about-us (last
visited Mar. 16, 2021).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Who We Are, ADF INT’L, https://adfinternational.org/who-we-are/ (last visited
Mar. 16, 2021).
60. Advocacy, ADF INT’L, https://adfinternational.org/advocacy/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2021).
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rights in Europe and worldwide.”61 ECLJ is the European arm of
the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ),62 and it advocates
in particular for the protection of religious freedoms and the
dignity of the person at the ECtHR. ECLJ also “bases its action on
‘the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of
European peoples and the true source of individual freedom,
political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis
of all genuine democracy[.]’”63
Both transnational Christian faith organizations have been
active in litigation beyond the domain of religious freedom and
have extended the agenda to topics that concern core issues for the
most conservative Christian groups such as same-sex civil
partnerships, same-sex marriages, bioethics, LGBT rights, religious
feelings and freedom of expression, the autonomy of the religious
groups, euthanasia, embryo screening, etc.64
The third Christian NGO active as a third-party intervener
before the ECtHR is Movimento per la Vita Italiano (the Italian ProLife Movement, or MPVI). The organization is not a transnational
NGO but an Italian association that brings together in a single
federation more than five hundred local pro-life movements,
centers, and services existing in Italy.65 The MPVI has the aim of
defending and promoting the value of human life “from conception
to natural death” and the recognition of every human being as the
holder of the inalienable right to life.66 Although Christianity is not
mentioned on the MPVI internet site, the Movimento per la Vita is an
association of the Catholic Church that aims to promote social
goals, and it is quite well spread across Italy.67 No information can
61. EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST., https://eclj.org/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
62. American Center for Law and Justice is a not-for-profit, religious corporation
“specifically dedicated to the ideal that religious freedom and freedom of speech are
inalienable, God-given rights . . . The organization has participated in numerous cases before
the Supreme Court[.]” AM. CTR. FOR L. & JUST., http://aclj.org/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
63. EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST., supra note 61.
64. For legal mobilization in courts, Hoover and den Dulk grouped two religious
traditions (evangelical Protestantism and Roman Catholicism) under the single rubric of
“Christian conservatives” because “both traditions have staked out socially conservative
positions on abortion and the right to die and on religion and education.” Hoover & den
Dulk, supra note 52, at 22.
65. Chi Siamo, MOVIMENTO PER LA VITA, http://www.mpv.org/il-movimento-per-lavita-italiano/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2021).
66. Id.
67. Catholic, SAPERE.IT, https://www.sapere.it/enciclopedia/catt%C3%B2lico.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2021).
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be found on MPVI’s internet site about its role before the ECtHR.
According to the HUDOC database, MPVI has intervened as
amicus curiae in two seminal cases: Costa & Pavan v. Italy68 and
Parrillo v. Italy.69
The research conducted in the online database HUDOC shows
that ADF International has intervened as a third party in fourteen
ECtHR decisions or judgments and an additional four decisions
under its American counterpart, ADF. ADF International and
Alliance Defending Freedom have both concurred in fourteen cases
together, and ADF International has intervened by itself in A. v.
Switzerland,70 Y.T. v. Bulgaria,71 A.A. v. Switzerland,72 and Wunderlich
v. Germany.73 It is difficult to understand the motivation to
intervene via both NGOs jointly in some cases while opting for
single interventions in other cases.
Regarding ECLJ, it has intervened as a third party twenty-four
times according to the HUDOC database (see, for example, W.K. v.
Sweden).74 Unfortunately, the data retrieved from the HUDOC
database is incomplete. For example, according to the ECLJ internet
site, this NGO has submitted some written submissions in B.B v.
Poland,75 Cassar v. Malta,76 and Teliatnikov v. Lithuania,77 but the
ECtHR does not refer to such participation.
Considering the inadequacy of the HUDOC database to
provide a comprehensive view of the actors intervening as amici
curiae, as well as the insufficiency of the data supplied by the above

68. Costa v. Italy, App. No. 54270/10, ¶ 6 (Aug. 28, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-112993.
69. Parrillo v. Italy, 2015-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 249, 258.
70. A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 60342/16 (Dec. 19, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-179573.
71. Y.T. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 41701/16 (July 9, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-203898.
72. A.A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 58802/12 (Jan. 7, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-139903.
73. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15 (Jan. 10, 2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994.
74. W.K. v. Sweden, App. No. 36802/15 (May 23, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-174797.
75. B.B. v. Poland, App. No. 67171/17 (Feb. 17, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-201485.
76. Cassar v. Malta, App. No. 36982/11 (July 9, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-123392.
77. Teliatnikov v. Lithuania, App. No. 51914/19 (June 8, 2020),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-202965.
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NGOs’ internet sites as third-party interveners, this Article relies on
the analysis of the forty-four cases gathered (see Appendix) to
examine the patterns of the mentioned Christian advocacy groups’
participation as third parties across time and topics at the ECtHR.
Knowing that Alliance Defending Freedom and ADF International
are interconnected in their roots, the following table shows that the
most repeat player at the Strasbourg Court is ECLJ. It is noteworthy
to underscore that ECLJ and ADF (and ADF International) often
join forces together.
Third-Party Interventions
European Centre for Law and Justice
ADF International, Alliance Defending Freedom
Alliance Defending Freedom, European Centre
for Law and Justice
ADF International
Alliance Defending Freedom
European Centre for Law and Justice, Movimento
per la Vita
ADF International, European Centre for Law
and Justice
Alliance Defending, European Centre for Law
and Justice
ADF
International,
Alliance
Defending
Freedom, European Centre for Law and Justice
Total

Cases
18
8

Percentage
40.9%
18.2%

5
4
4

11.4%
9.1%
9.1%

2

4.5%

1

2.3%

1

2.3%

1
44

2.3%

Table 1: Third-Party Interventions by Actors Involved

1. The substantive areas of concern as third-party interveners
For clarity, the forty-four cases have been classified according
to four main topics that are “religious-oriented” or include a
religious factor: (1) family and private life (abortion, procreation
technologies, gender identity, and same-sex couples), (2) autonomy
of religious groups and individual religious freedom, (3) freedom
of expression, and (4) religion-based refugee claims. These four
categories touch a variety of articles of the ECHR, and the list of
cases analyzed here fall mainly on the following articles of the
Convention: Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition on torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Article 8
(right to respect for private and family life), Article 9 (freedom of
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religion or belief), Article 10 (freedom of expression),78 and Article
2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to education).79 It is beyond the scope of
this Article to consider in detail the trends and ambivalences of the
Strasbourg Court case law on each of the mentioned articles. What
this contribution will seek to do, however, is to first consider the
impact of intervention, either in the determination of facts of the
case or in the legal approach to the question at stake, and once
determined, to analyze the influence of the written submission by
the third parties in the outcome of the cases.
2. Family and private life
The greatest number of the Christian advocacy groups’
interventions (twenty-one out of the forty-four cases) have been
proposed under the umbrella of private life and family life cases,
and they deal almost exclusively with Article 8 of the ECHR. This
Article encompasses four concepts that have been given
autonomous meaning by the Strasbourg organs: “private life,
family life, home, and correspondence[.]”80 As regards “family life”
and “private life,” the ECtHR has extended the scope of Article 8
by incorporating social, legal, and technological developments, and
it is difficult to provide definitions for both terms. Indeed, “private
life” has been described by the ECtHR as “not susceptible to
exhaustive definition[,]”81 and therefore, it is not surprising that
new rights are born out of the right of respect for private life.82 In
Pretty v. United Kingdom, the court gave an overview of the meaning
of “private life” as an area that “covers the physical and
psychological integrity of a person . . . [that will] sometimes
embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity[.]”83
Such elements as, for example, gender identification, name, sexual
orientation, and sexual life, fall within the personal sphere
78. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 25.
79. Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
80. Maris Burbergs, How the Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and
Correspondence Became the Nursery in Which New Rights Are Born, in SHAPING RIGHTS IN THE
ECHR: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 315, 322 (Eva Brems & Janneke Gerards eds., 2013).
81. Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13134/87, ¶ 36 (Mar. 25, 1993),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57804.
82. Burbergs, supra note 80, at 323.
83. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 193.
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protected by Article 8. Article 8 also protects a right to personal
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships
with other human beings and the outside world. Although no
previous case has established the right to self-determination
contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the court will consider that
the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle
underlying the interpretation of its guarantees.84 The Strasbourg
Court’s approach to the notion of personal autonomy conflicts
bluntly with the notion of human rights that Christian advocacy
groups support. To these groups, human rights are not arbitrarily
defined according to the will of an individual concerning each
subject. As ECLJ has particularly noted in the written observations
submitted in Cassar v. Malta:
[I]t is necessary to preserve even the philosophy of the
Convention, as it is from its philosophy that its authority is
derived. . . . Subjectivism relative to individualism, by rejecting
the reference to the nature of man, leads to the destruction of the
basis and philosophy of human rights.85

The contrast in understanding between the philosophy beyond the
ECHR for the Christian third parties and the Strasbourg Court is
noticeable. For the latter, ECHR rights and freedom should be
interpreted in the light of contemporary practice, and it would be
futile to argue that ECHR should primarily be interpreted in
accordance with the original intent of the drafters. For example,
from the late 1980s, the court read Article 2 in a context of a
contemporary rejection of the death penalty,86 while for some
Christian groups such as ECLJ, “the universality of human rights
presupposes and requires a universal concept of man” and the
universality of rights (i.e., the right to marry) requires universal
concepts (i.e., concept of marriage).87
a. Marriage, transgender marriage, and same-sex marriage.
Likewise, ECLJ underlined in the written observations in Cassar v.

84. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Court considers that the notion of personal autonomy is an
important principle underlying the interpretation of [Article 8’s] guarantees.”)
85. Written Observations for Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Third-Party Intervener at 9,
Cassar v. Malta, App. No. 36982/11 (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter Written Observations for ECLJ
in
Cassar],
https://7676076fde29cb34e26d-759f611b127203e9f2a0021aa1b7da05.ssl.cf2.
rackcdn.com/eclj/echr-cassar-v-malta-eclj-observations-en.pdf.
86. See Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989).
87. Written Observations for ECLJ in Cassar, supra note 85, at 16.
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Malta the content of the right to marriage. According to the ECLJ’s
philosophy, the right to marriage has been considered not as an
individual right that belongs to a person, but a right that belongs to
the couple. Additionally, the content of the right to marry is not
determined by its subject—it is precisely defined by society.
Therefore, Article 12 of the ECHR enshrines a reciprocal
commitment between the couple and society, where the right to
marry involves three players (the man, the woman, and society),
with a common interest (the family). This approach is well reflected
in the case Orlandi v. Italy, a seminal case about the right to marriage
for same-sex couples.88 In Orlandi, ECLJ joined forces with Alliance
Defending Freedom. The latter provided to the Strasbourg Court
information about heterosexual marriage in the European context.
ADF insisted that there is a European consensus on recognizing
marriage exclusively between a man and a woman. The ELCJ
provided to the court detailed information about marriage
registration and the scope of the notion of public order.
Surprisingly, the Orlandi Strasbourg judgment only partly
reproduces the written observations submitted by ECLJ.89 Despite
the fact that the submitted written observations are long and
founded in comparative law and case law analysis, the ECtHR
addressed them both very briefly and refuted the arguments of
public order90 and the lack of legal recognition of same-sex couples
in a superficial manner.91 The court found a violation of Article 8
since the State (Italy) failed to ensure that the applicants had
available a specific legal framework providing for the recognition

88. Orlandi v. Italy, App. Nos. 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12 & 60088/12 (Dec. 14,
2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-179547.
89. Written Observations for Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Third-Party Intervener, Orlandi,
App. Nos. 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12 & 60088/12 [hereinafter Written Observations for
ECLJ in Orlandi], https://7676076fde29cb34e26d-759f611b127203e9f2a0021aa1b7da05.ssl.
cf2.rackcdn.com/eclj/Oliari-Orlandi-v-Italy-ECHR-ECLJ-WO-English.pdf.
90. Unlike other provisions of the Convention, Article 8 did not list “the notion of
‘public order’ as one of the legitimate aims in the interests of which a State m[ight]
interfere with an individual’s rights.” Orlandi, App. Nos. 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12 &
60088/12, ¶ 200.
91. “[T]o date[,] . . . twenty-seven countries out of the forty-seven [Council of Europe]
member states h[ad] . . . enacted legislation permitting same-sex couples to have their
relationship recognised . . . .” Id. ¶ 112. The same could not be said about registration of
same-sex marriages. Id. ¶ 113.
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and protection of their same-sex unions.92 Although the third-party
submissions meticulously analyzed the legal arguments and
comparative law, NGOs’ interventions did not have an impact on
the legal reasoning in the outcome of the Orlandi case. In this latter
case, ECLJ reiterated the argument against the interpretation of the
Convention in light of the circumstances and noted that:
[T]hese circumstances only provide guidance and cannot be
substituted in place of the Convention as the principal point of
reference. Otherwise, the mission of the Court would be
transformed, particularly regarding social issues, into an
instrument of the ideological updating of national legislation.
This path would lead far beyond its jurisdiction.93

b. Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and gender
reassignment. This category comprises several cases in which the
Strasbourg Court connects ARTs with family and private life. In the
case of S.H. v. Austria,94 the court clarified that the right of a couple
to use ARTs to conceive a child falls under the scope of Article 8.
The right to respect for private and family life was further
expanded in Costa v. Italy, where the court held that it covers “the
applicants’ desire to conceive a child unaffected by the genetic
disease of which they are healthy carriers and to use ART and [preimplantation genetic diagnosis] to this end[.]”95 Similar to other
cases like Orlandi v. Italy, the ECtHR referred only briefly to the
arguments submitted by the amici curiae. For example, in Costa v.
Italy, it is worthy to note that if the content of the amici’s submission
does not add any new element to the argumentation advanced by
the government, the court uses sentences like “[t]he first third-party
intervener reiterated the observations of the respondent
Government[,]”96 which renders it difficult to know if the court has
taken into consideration the scientific explanations about ARTs
submitted by the third parties. Regardless of the disagreements
92. In Schalk v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409, 429, the court stated that Article 12
cannot “in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite
sex . . . [But] whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regulation by the national
law of the Contracting State.” See also JENS M. SCHERPE, THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF
EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW 24–27 (2016); SHAZIA CHOUDHRY & JONATHAN HERRING, EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FAMILY LAW 148–51, 167–69 (2010).
93. Written Observations for ECLJ in Orlandi, supra note 89, at 6.
94. S.H. v. Austria, 2011-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 295, 318.
95. Costa
v.
Italy,
App.
No.
54270/10,
¶ 57
(Aug.
28,
2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112993.
96. Id. ¶ 50.
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among the third parties and the ECtHR about whether ARTs
should fall under Article 8, the court agreed with the third party
that there was not a positive obligation on the member states for
medically assisted procreation techniques.97 More specifically, the
Grand Chamber held in S.H. v. Austria that the absolute ban on ova
donation and sperm donation for in vitro fertilization did not
exceed the states’ margin of appreciation.98
Another emblematic case in terms of the high number of
observations submitted by the third-party interveners is Parrillo v.
Italy.99 This case reached the Grand Chamber and touches core
issues for Christian advocacy groups: the right to life, the right over
embryos as a property right, human dignity, the ontological
conception of human rights, and states’ margin of appreciation.
ECLJ and MPVI were authorized to submit an amicus brief. Since
the full text of the written submissions is not available in the
HUDOC database, we only have access to the submissions
presented by ECLJ through its internet site. No information has
been found regarding the Movimento per la Vita’s brief in Parrillo.
According to the text of the judgment, the arguments put through
by Movimento per la Vita were scarce and quite redundant.100 Both
advocacy groups insisted that in vitro embryos in a state of
cryopreservation should benefit from the protection of the
measures of Italian law that forbid the destruction of human
embryos. Additionally, they noted that since embryos are subjects,
“they cannot be things or objects of a right in rem, and cannot be
deliberately destroyed.”101 The ECtHR observed in Parrillo that,
according to its case law, the concept of “private life” within the
meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad one, not
susceptible to an exhaustive definition, and embraces, among other
things, a right to self-determination. The concept also incorporates
the right to respect for both the decisions to become and not to
become a parent. Regarding the particular question of the fate of
97. S.H., 2011-V Eur. Ct. H.R., at 316–17.
98. See ALICE MARGARIA, THE CONSTRUCTION OF FATHERHOOD: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 52–53 (2019).
99. Parrillo v. Italy, 2015-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 249.
100. Id. at 293.
101. “The legal principle of the primacy of the human being clearly contradicts the
justification of the destruction of embryos in vitro in the interest of science.” ECHR to Rule
on the Status of Embryo, EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST., https://eclj.org/eugenics/echr/theeuropean-court-on-human-rights-to-rule-on-the-status-of-the-human-embryo (last visited
Mar. 17, 2021).
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embryos obtained from assisted reproduction, the court had regard
to the parties’ freedom of choice. However, the right to donate
embryos to scientific research is not one of the core rights attracting
the protection of Article 8 of the Convention, as it does not concern
a particularly important aspect of the applicant’s existence and
identity. Consequently, the court considered that the respondent
State should have afforded a wide margin of appreciation. Once
again, although the legal reasoning advanced by the Christian
advocacy groups and by the ECtHR are quite divergent, the
outcome with regards to the scope of the margin of appreciation is
similar. The difference is the willingness of the court to apply the
Convention as a living instrument in accordance with individuals’
needs through a careful implementation of the proportionality test.
However, where the court is unable to find the existence of a
European consensus and the state’s margin of appreciation
prevails, the Strasbourg jurisprudence may coincide with Christian
advocacy groups if they endorse the government’s arguments.
In the same way, the margin of appreciation has been very
relevant in cases regarding gender reassignment and the right to
gender identity. There have been a high number of cases with the
active participation of ECLJ and ADF International: A.P. , Garçon &
Nicot v. France,102 X v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,103 Y.T.
v. Bulgaria,104 and S.V. v. Italy.105 Both NGOs indicated that this line
of cases raises fundamental questions regarding definitions in the
spheres of ethics, psychology, and medical science, and the states
should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in striking a balance
between the competing public and private interests at stake.
Therefore, how states addressed transgender issues would depend
on the specific features of each state.106 In contrast, the ECtHR has
carefully weighed the competing interests in each case and has
expressly asserted that Article 8 may also impose certain positive
obligations on the state. These obligations may involve the
adoption of specific measures, including the provision of an
102. A.P. v. France, App. Nos. 79885/12, 52471/13 & 52596/13 (Apr. 6, 2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172913.
103. X v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 29683/16 (Jan. 17, 2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-189096.
104. Y.T. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 41701/16 (July 9, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-203493.
105. S.V. v. Italy, App. No. 55216/08 (Oct. 11, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-187111.
106. See X, ¶ 60.
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effective and accessible means of protecting the right to respect for
private life. Such measures may include both the provision of a
regulatory framework of adjudicatory and enforcement machinery
protecting individuals’ rights and the implementation, where
appropriate, of these measures in different contexts.107 For example,
in X v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the applicant’s Article
8 grievances concerned allegations about the lack of regulatory
framework for legal gender recognition and the requirement that
such recognition is conditional on complete sex reassignment
surgery. In A.P. v. France, the court reiterated that this kind of
application entails essential aspects of an individual’s intimate
identity, physical integrity, and sexual identity, and making
recognition of the sexual identity of transgender persons
conditional on undergoing an operation or treatment entailing
sterilization against their wishes is a violation of the Convention.
However, the state parties retained a wide margin of approval in
deciding whether to impose the condition of a prior psychological
diagnosis for the identity of transgender persons.108 Similarly, in
S.V. v. Italy, with regards to the refusal by the authorities to
authorize a change of forename before the completion of gender
reassignment surgery, ADF International repeated the same
arguments as in A.P. v. France, and the Strasbourg Court observed
that “the rigid nature of the judicial procedure for recognizing the
gender identity of transgender persons . . . , which [had] placed the
applicant for an unreasonable time in an anomalous position” that
was apt to engender feelings of “vulnerability, humiliation[,] and
anxiety[,]” constituted a violation of Article 8.109 Similarly, in the
recent case Y.T. v. Bulgaria in July 2020, the ECtHR restated the
relevance of the vulnerability of the applicant when assessing the
violation of Article 8. The court identified that the rigidity in the
domestic courts’ reasoning had placed Y.T. for an unreasonable and

107. See Hämäläinen v. Finland, 2014-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 369, 390–91.
108. A.P. v. France, App. Nos. 79885/12, 52471/13 and 52596/13, ¶¶ 116–28 (Apr. 6,
2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172913.
109. S.V., App. No. 55216/08, ¶¶ 53, 72; see also Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)5 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of
Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/
result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805cf40a (last visited Mar. 17, 2021).
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continuous period in a troubling position, in which he was liable to
experience feelings of “vulnerability, humiliation[,] and anxiety.”110
c. The right to life and the right to end life: abortion and euthanasia
cases. The Strasbourg organs authorize States, within their limited
margin of appreciation, to determine the starting point of the right
to life in their domestic legal system.111 In the case of A, B & C v.
Ireland, the court ruled that there was no European consensus as to
the scientific and legal definition of the starting point of the life of
a person.112 As a Grand Chamber case, A, B & C v. Ireland had a high
number of written observations from pro-life NGOs, and the court
held that while Article 8 could not be interpreted as conferring a
right to abortion, its prohibition in Ireland came within the scope of
the applicants’ right to respect for their physical and psychological
integrity within their private lives under Article 8.113 The most
striking difference between the ECtHR and the Christian advocacy
groups is that while the court relies on the States’ margin of
appreciation concerning the question of when life begins, as there
is no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of
the beginning of life, ECLJ explicitly criticized the ECtHR’s
reasoning in A, B & C v. Ireland:
To speak of a “scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life”
confuses scientific reality and its judicial representation, the fact
(the child) and the value (the person). . . . It cannot be claimed that
it is the state of scientific knowledge (that is to say, embryology
and foetology) which makes it “impossible to answer the question
whether the unborn child is a ‘person,’” it is only a matter of moral
understanding, a choice of values, and not an issue of fact.114

Here, there are two different approaches: one relies on facts such as
a possible European consensus on when life begins, and the other
relies on fundamental principles beyond European consensus. On
one hand, the ECtHR holds that “[t]he Convention is intended to
110. Y.T. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 41701/16, ¶ 72 (July 9, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-203898 (editors’ translation). The domestic authorities’ refusal to grant legal
recognition to Y.T.’s gender reassignment, without giving relevant and sufficient
reasons thus constituted an unjustified interference with Y.T.’s right to respect for his private
life. Id. ¶ 74.
111. Vo v. France, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 67, 107–08.
112. A v. Ireland, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 185, 243.
113. Id. at 255.
114. GRÉGOR PUPPINCK, ABORTION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3
(Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just., 2015), http://media.aclj.org/pdf/FINAL-6.-Abortion-and-theEuropean-Court-of-Human-RightsV1.pdf.
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guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that
are practical and effective[.]”115 This is the reason why the
Strasbourg Court has found states to be under a positive obligation
to secure to their citizens the right to effective respect for their
physical and psychological integrity, and it has found that
the prohibition of abortion when sought for reasons of health
and/or well-being falls within the scope of the right to respect
for one’s private life.116 On the other hand, for Christian advocacy
groups, there is a founded philosophical approach to the definition
of a person:
[T]he unborn child and the person materially designate the same
thing, a single and unique being. . . . The distinction between the
unborn child and the person is fictional, because the notion of the
person itself becomes fictional from the moment it claims to mean
something other than tangible reality. This difference between the
fact (the child) and the notion (person) only exists by choice, in
order to make space for individual liberty. . . . The human being
is then a person because of and in proportion to his animation by
his spirit . . . .117

This latter argument has also been deployed by the Christian
groups in cases regarding assisted suicide and euthanasia. For
example, Gross v. Switzerland is another Grand Chamber judgment
with a high number of third-party interventions but with no access
to the submissions written by them.118 Unfortunately, the court did
not even refer to the content of the written submissions. In Gross v.
Switzerland, the applicant complained, relying on Article 8 of the
Convention, that the Swiss authorities, by depriving her of the
possibility of obtaining a lethal dose of sodium pentobarbital, had
violated her right to decide by what means and at what point her
life would end. The court did not address substantial issues but
decided the case on Article 35 section 3(a) grounds (abuse of the
right of petition).119 Although the court did not delve into
substantive considerations, ECLJ’s written submission, available
115. See Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 305, 314 (1979); see also
P. v. Poland, App. No. 57375/08, ¶ 99 (Oct. 30, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001114098 (using a similar approach to Airey v. Ireland); A.K. v. Latvia, App. No. 33011/08
(June 24, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145005.
116. P., App. No. 57375/08, ¶ 96.
117. PUPPINCK, supra note 114, at 4.
118. Gross v. Switzerland, 2014-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 463.
119. Id. at 477.
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on the NGO’s internet site, provides substantive points for
reflection. ELCJ relies on Pretty v. United Kingdom, in which the
court stated that “Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language,
be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right,
namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination
in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose
death rather than life.”120 ECLJ, in its amicus brief, asked whether
the State should have an obligation to take positive action to
prevent suicide or whether an assisted suicide falls within the scope
of private life, and argued the state obligation to prevent suicide is
conditioned on the autonomy of the person. It is interesting how
ECLJ frames this dilemma as two conflicting values at stake:
personal autonomy vs. the principle of heteronomy.121 The
mentioned Christian NGO understands the principle of
heteronomy as a set of values, as objective and universal as
possible, which arise from universal human nature and upon which
the ECHR has been built. Consequently, the ECtHR should not
adjudicate cases without taking into consideration these universal
and heteronomous values.
d. Foster care and family life. The following cases of Lobben v.
Norway,122 Wunderlich v. Germany,123 Tlapak v. Germany,124 and
Wetjen v. Germany125 deal with parental rights and upbringing of
children, foster care, corporal punishment, and homeschooling. In
all these cases, the court confronts two potential competing rights:
the right to have family and the protection of family ties versus the

120. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 186.
121. “This conception of individual autonomy, seen as a liberation of the individual
from standards of society that are perceived as heteronomous, poses a danger to social unity,
as well as to the consistency and effectiveness of the law, including the law pertaining to
human rights.” Written Observations for Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Third-Party Intervener at
8, Gross, 2014-IV Eur Ct. H.R. 463 (No. 67810/10), https://eclj.org/pdf/alda-gross-vswitzerland.pdf.
122. Lobben
v.
Norway,
App.
No.
37283/13
(Sept.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-195909.
123. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15 (Jan. 10, 2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994.
124. Tlapak v. Germany, App. Nos. 11308/16 & 11344/16 (Mar. 22, 2018),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-181584.
125. Wetjen v. Germany, App. Nos. 68125/14 & 72204/14 (Mar. 22, 2018),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-181583.
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child’s best interests. In Tlapak v. Germany and Wetjen v. Germany,126
ADF International appears as the only third-party intervener to
emphasize the importance of upholding family ties. The court
asserts that Article 8 requires a fair balance between the interests of
the child and those of the parent and, in striking such a balance,
particular importance must be attached to the best interests of the
child.127 The prevalence of the best interest of the child also follows
in Lobben and Others v. Norway. In this latter case, ADF International
emphasized that “family was internationally recognised as the
fundamental group of society and of particular importance to
children . . . [and] emphasised the duty to maintain contact
between parents and children and to provide practical assistance to
families.”128 However, the court reiterates:
[T]he best interests of the child dictate, on the one hand, that the
child’s ties with its family must be maintained, except in cases
where the family has proved particularly unfit, since severing
those ties means cutting a child off from its roots. It follows that
family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances
and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations
and, if and when appropriate, to “rebuild” the family . . . .129

In Wunderlich v. Germany,130 ECLJ strongly defends the parents’
rights in homeschooling since “family takes precedence on State,
particularly as regards education and teaching.”131 The parents
complained to the ECtHR about the violation of their family life
under Article 8. The court acknowledges the infringement of this
right but considers that Germany has the right to prohibit
homeschooling to protect the interest of the child and concludes
126. In both cases, the applicants were members of the Twelve Tribes Church, a
religious community where it was alleged various forms of corporal punishment were used
in the upbringing of children.
127. Tlapak, App. Nos. 11308/16 & 11344/16, ¶ 82.
128. Lobben v. Norway, App. No. 37283/13, ¶ 192 (Sept. 10, 2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-195909.
129. Id. ¶ 207.
130. Mr. and Mrs. Wunderlich had four children and wished to teach them at home,
which is forbidden in Germany. The German courts withdrew the custody of their
children and asked them to hand over the children to a legal guardian so that they could go
to school. The children repeatedly refused to accompany the guardian who came to
take them away. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, ¶ 14 (Jan. 10, 2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994.
131. Written Observations for Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Third-Party Intervener at 1,
Wunderlich, App. No. 18925/15 [hereinafter Written Observations for ECLJ in Wunderlich],
http://media.aclj.org/pdf/EN-Observations-ECLJ-Wunderlich-v-Germany.pdf.
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that the withdrawal from homeschooling was fully necessary and
proportionate in a democratic society and that there was no
violation of the right to respect for family life. The ECtHR
supported the German courts that justified the partial withdrawal
of parental authority by relying on the risk of the persistent refusal
of the applicants to send their children to school, stating:
[T]he children would not only acquire knowledge but also
learn social skills, such as tolerance or assertiveness, and
have contact with persons other than their family, in particular
children of their age. The [German] Court of Appeal further
held that the applicants’ children were being kept in a
“symbiotic” family system.132

The observations about homeschooling submitted by ECLJ are very
interesting. Considering that homeschooling is quite widespread in
the United States and supported by ACLJ, which is directly
connected to ECLJ, the latter reminds the ECtHR that the rights of
parents are natural rights and are entitled to full respect in their
freedom of education by the state. According to ECLJ, public or
state school is in no way a guarantee of political and ideological
neutrality; “quite the opposite, experience shows that families are
generally less politicized than the State, and hence constitute a
natural obstacle to totalitarianism.”133 The ECtHR fears “the
emergence of parallel societies” based on separate philosophical
convictions;134 on the contrary, ECLJ contends that not allowing
homeschooling will result in homogenous society by the state
without respect for minorities and families.

132. Wunderlich, App. No. 18925/15, ¶ 49.
133. Written Observations for ECLJ in Wunderlich, supra note 131, at 7.
134. In Wunderlich,
The Court further reiterates that it has already examined cases regarding the
German system of imposing compulsory school attendance while excluding home
education. It has found it established that the State, in introducing such a system,
had aimed at ensuring the integration of children into society with a view to
avoiding the emergence of parallel societies, considerations that were in line with
the Court’s own case-law on the importance of pluralism for democracy and which
fell within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation in setting up and
interpreting rules for their education systems[.]
Wunderlich, App. No. 18925/15, ¶ 50.
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3. Autonomy of religious groups and individual religious freedom
Church autonomy has been one of the workhorses for Christian
advocacy groups at the ECtHR, and the Strasbourg Court has been
very sensitive to their arguments as third-party interveners.
Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious communities has
been considered indispensable for pluralism in democratic societies
because it directly concerns not only the organization of the
community as such but also the effective enjoyment of the right to
freedom of religion by all its active members. As the Strasbourg
Court noted in Martínez v. Spain, if the organizational life of the
community is not protected by Article 9, all other aspects of the
individual’s freedom of religion would become vulnerable.135
Alliance Defending Freedom submitted written observations
jointly with ECLJ in Travaš v. Croatia,136 and it stood alone as a third
party in Nagy v. Hungary.137 ECLJ was not accompanied as amicus
curiae by ADF in Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania138 nor in
Martínez. The Strasbourg Court has outlined that the respect for the
autonomy principle of religious communities implies, among other
aspects that cannot be exhausted here, that states, including
national courts, cannot decide on the question of the religious
belonging of an individual or group, which is the sole responsibility
of the authorities of the religious communities. In this point, the
ECtHR is very much aligned with the arguments submitted by the
mentioned NGOs. However, problems arise when religious
autonomy conflicts with the individual beliefs of the member or the
employee of the religious group (Article 9) or with her or his private
and family life (Article 8). ADF and ECLJ have jointly argued that
the “exercise of Church autonomy guaranteed under Article 9 of
the Convention . . . could not as such be subjected to judicial review
before the civil courts[.]”139 Moreover, for both advocacy groups,
the principle of heightened duty of loyalty, recognized in labor law,
should be applicable in the context of employment by a religious
community, irrespective of whether such employment was direct

135. Martínez v. Spain, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 449, 482–83.
136. Travaš v. Croatia, App. No. 75581/13 (Oct. 4, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-166942.
137. Nagy v. Hungary, App. No. 56665/09 (Sept. 14, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-177070.
138. Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, 2013-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 41.
139. Travaš, App. No. 75581/13, ¶ 73.
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or indirect through the state employment system.140 Despite the
ECtHR’s tendency to strongly protect organizational autonomy, a
new trend seems to be emerging for balancing religious autonomy
with the right to private life (Article 8)—a more contextual and
sensitive approach to cases involving conflicting rights.141
In cases regarding the manifestation of religious freedom
through personal or static symbols, the two Christian NGOs
provided interesting arguments in their written submissions on
two landmark cases, Lautsi v. Italy142 and Eweida v. United
Kingdom.143 Following U.S. case law in Lautsi v. Italy, ADF, on behalf
of thirty-two members of European Parliament, outlined the fact
that a cross, certainly a Christian symbol, by its placement in the
public sphere does not necessarily promote a Christian message
when some religious symbols have been secularized.144 ADF
insisted “that the ‘separation of church and state’ does not require
the eradication of all public symbols in the public realm” but rather
their “accommodation.”145 Similarly, ECLJ, jointly with ADF, drew
the court’s attention to the concept of reasonable accommodation
of religious beliefs and practices, insofar as that accommodation
did not cause “undue hardship” to the employer.146 American case
law played an important role in the legal reasoning in the ECtHR’s
assessment of both cases in their third-party interventions by the
Christian advocacy groups.
It is also remarkable to note that ADF International has
intervened to extend the scope of freedom of religion in cases
regarding members of minority groups, particularly Jehovah’s
Witnesses who refuse to perform their military service. In

140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 88.
142. Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61.
143. Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215.
144. Written Observations for All. Def. Fund on Behalf of 32 Members of European
Parliament as Third-Party Interveners at 2–3, Lautsi, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61 (No. 30814/06),
http://1ztp833emcflef7tm24jjqbe-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/
12/Lautsi-and-Others-v.-Italy_ADF-Brief4.pdf.
145. Id. at 2 (quoting Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010)).
146. Written Observations for All. Def. Fund et al. as Third-Party Interveners at 9–10,
Eweida, 2013-I Eur Ct. H.R. 215 (Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 & 36516/10) (citing Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent case law).

1358

1359

Christian Faith-Based Organizations

Mammadov v. Azerbaijan147 and in Papavasilakis v. Greece,148 ADF
acknowledged the difficulty in practice for domestic courts to
assess whether a claim relating to a belief was genuine and
sincere.149 For that reason, ADF encouraged the court to follow the
framework for evaluating such claims and noted that the question
was whether an individual opposed to the obligation to perform
military service was placed “in a serious conflict between that
obligation[,] . . . his or her genuinely and deeply held religious”
beliefs, and being “forced to act against the dictates of his or her
conscience.”150 In these cases, the NGO’s intervention was just a
reminder to the ECtHR of previous case law.151
4. Freedom of expression
Four cases regarding the freedom of expression, Religious
Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Azerbaijan,152 Annen v.
Germany,153 Alekhina v. Russia,154 and E.S. v. Austria,155 reveal the
relevance of freedom of speech for ADF and ECLJ. The latter
advocated for abolishing blasphemy as a criminal charge in E.S. v
Austria,156 and in Religious Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses, ADF

147. Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 14604/08 (Oct. 17, 2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-197066.
148. Papavasilakis v. Greece, App. No. 66899/14 (Sept. 15, 2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-166850.
149. Id. ¶ 49.
150. Id.; see Mammadov, App. No. 14604/08, ¶ 74 (using similar language).
151. Interestingly, the court extended the scope of Article 9 of the Convention to
conscientious objections to compulsory military service in Bayatyan v. Armenia, 2011-IV Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1, 34, by applying its living instrument doctrine to interpret Article 9 in accordance
with the current standard recognizing conscientious objection. In this case, the President
gave leave to intervene in the written procedure to the European Association of Jehovah’s
Christian Witnesses. Id. at 8.
152. Religious Cmty. of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 52884/09 (Feb. 20,
2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-201087. ADF International intervened to
underscore the importance of religious freedom and freedom of expression as well as the
dangerous precedent it sets when the government is allowed to blacklist certain religious
texts. See id. ¶ 23
153. Annen v. Germany, App. No. 3690/10 (Nov. 26, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-158880.
154. Alekhina v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 38004/12 (July 17, 2018),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-184666 (involving the Russian feminist punk band,
Pussy Riot).
155. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12 (Oct. 25, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-187188.
156. Id. ¶ 38.
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encouraged the court to not restrict the dissemination of religious
publications unless done “in response to a particular pressing social
need.”157 To safeguard tolerance, broadmindedness, and pluralism,
freedom of expression could be hampered only exceptionally.158
The line of argumentation goes in hand with the ECtHR’s general
principles on Article 10. The Christian advocacy groups endorse
religious minorities’ claims, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses’s
application, because it involves litigation to protect the
manifestation of religion, which is part of these NGOs’ main goals.
5. Religion-based refugee claims
According to the UN guidelines’ general principles on religionbased refugee claims, religion should be broadly interpreted “to
encompass freedom of thought, conscience or belief[,]”159 and
membership in a persecuted group with a reasonable fear of
persecution should be enough for asylum adjudication.160 There are
two controversial questions addressed by the ECtHR and the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that have driven the
attention of ECLJ and ADF. The first is regarding the definition of
persecution and which kind of interference with the right to
religious freedom would constitute persecution. The second
regards the extent to which an asylum seeker is expected to conceal
or restrain their religion in their country of origin to avoid
persecution. The participation of ECLJ and ADF, as NGOs
defending religious freedom for Christians worldwide, deserves
attention in the following cases: A. v. Switzerland,161 F.G. v. Sweden,

157. Religious Cmty. of Jehovah’s Witnesses, App. No. 52884/09, ¶ 23.
158. Annen, App. No. 3690/10, ¶ 48 (summarizing ADF’s reasoning that “controversial
opinions expressed in the course of an intense political debate of public interest
[are] protected under Article 10, even if formulated in strong, offensive, shocking or
disturbing language[,]” and that any restrictions on such speech must be justified by
“significant reasons”).
159. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEE, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION:
RELIGION-BASED REFUGEE CLAIMS UNDER ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR
THE
1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 3 (2004),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/40d8427a4/guidelines-internationalprotection-6-religion-based-refugee-claims-under.html.
160. See Rosita Šorytė, Religious Persecution, Refugees, and Right of Asylum: The Case of
The Church of Almighty God, 2 J. CESNUR 78, 78–99 (2018).
161. A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 60342/16 (Dec. 19, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-179573.
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and A.A. v. Switzerland.163 In A. v. Switzerland, the ECtHR
endorsed an expulsion of a convert in Iran and accepted the
argument of the Swiss government according to which the
Christians “who practised their faith discreetly, did not face a real
risk of ill-treatment upon return.”164 However, one year earlier, in
F.G. v. Sweden, the Grand Chamber of the Court had refused to
deport a converted Iranian to his country, and the court explained
that it could not “accept the respondent State’s assumption that the
applicant would not be persecuted in Iran because he could engage
in a low-profile, discreet or even secret practice of his religious
beliefs.”165 ECLJ and ADF submitted legally grounded third-party
observations in F.G. v. Sweden in which they reminded the court
that “in the light of the CJEU’s judgment in Bundesrepublik
Deutschland v. Y and Z . . . , the applicant could not be expected to
conceal his religion to avoid persecution covered by Article 3 of the
Convention.”166 The same line of argumentation was presented by
ADF International in A.A. v. Switzerland, and the ECtHR considered
that the return to Afghanistan of an asylum seeker who had
converted to Christianity would be contrary to the European
Convention because after returning to Afghanistan, A.A. could not
be expected to “modify his social behavior to confine his faith to the
strictly private domain” to the point of even hiding his baptism.167
162

CONCLUSION
The research above has revealed the strategies of the three main
Christian advocacy NGOs as third-party interveners before the
ECtHR: (1) whether their written submissions result in a broad
impact in Strasbourg’s legal reasoning, (2) whether they aimed to
legitimize their own organizations and signal to their members
about the relevance of their role to inform and assist the court, or
(3) whether their participation aims to influence public policies on
specific matters in European states by raising awareness of the
162. F.G. v. Sweden, App. No. 43611/11 (Mar. 23, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-161829.
163. A.A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 32218/17 (Nov. 5, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-197217.
164. A., App. No. 60342/16, ¶ 44.
165. F.G., App. No. 43611/11, ¶ 6.
166. Id. ¶ 108.
167. A.A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 32218/17, ¶ 55 (Nov. 5, 2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-197217 (author’s translation).
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relevance of highly contested topics such as abortion, same-sex
marriage, procreation techniques, assisted suicide, etc.
The best third-party intervention assists the court by providing
legal materials and helping in interpreting and applying the rights
set out in the Convention. However, as the third-party procedure
stands, it is difficult to know how effective their interventions have
been: the written submissions are not public, and the court only
refers partially to the content of the submissions. What should be
self-evident from this analysis is that through their amicus
participation, ECLJ, ADF or ADF International, and MPVI have
sought to assist the court in a partisan way (the Modern Amicus, in
Mohan’s typology)168 to influence the outcome of the ECtHR when
adjudicating Convention rights that touch fundamental principles
of these NGOs: religious freedom, the sanctity of life, marriage and
family, and Christianity. Nevertheless, these third parties have also
assisted (as Mohan’s Intervening Good Samaritan) on comparative
law (Lautsi v. Italy), on the context and circumstances of the facts of
the case (F.G. v. Sweden), and in providing information to the court
about the court’s own precedents for the interpretation of rights
(Gross v. Switzerland).
The three advocacy groups have taken “proactive” litigation to
get as much impact as possible in matters broadening the scope of
freedom of religion for individuals (conscientious objections and
religious accommodation) and groups (autonomy of religious
groups). Even when advancing their own interests on these
matters, above all, they have had an impact on the court’s
adjudicative task because their submissions have reinforced the
court’s legal assessments.
However, on sensitive ethical issues such as family life and
private life, their interventions can be described as “reactive”
litigation as part of their conservative agenda because they
advocate for maintaining the rights that were articulated by the
Convention’s drafters. As a result, they have challenged the
evolutive interpretation of the “progressive” articles of ECHR
linked to personal autonomy, the right to self-determination, and
the principle of the child’s best interests.
Finally, the present research also shows the contrasting
approaches from the ECtHR and these repeat-Christian players
before the court in claims of ultimate validity, grounded in
168. Mohan, supra note 30, at 371.
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ontological foundations, such as the definition of a person, the selfcontained authoritative philosophy of the Convention, and the
existence of parallel sovereignty spheres like churches and families.
In these particular matters, what can be witnessed is a struggle in
which the interventions of the traditional friend of the court, amicus
curiae, as described in Section II.B, could slowly turn into an
“inimicus curiae,” an antagonist to the court.
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APPENDIX: CASE TABLE
Case Title

Third-Party
Intervention

ECHR

Outcome

1

Lobben v.
Norway (G.C)

ADF International
Alliance Defending
Freedom

Art. 8

Violation of Art. 8

2

A.P., Garçon &
Nicot v. France

ADF International

Art. 8

3

Wunderlich v.
Germany

Art. 8

4

Wetjen v.
Germany

5

Tlapak v.
Germany

ADF International
European Centre
for Law and Justice
ADF International
Alliance Defending
Freedom
ADF International
Alliance Defending
Freedom

No violation of
Art. 8 for two
applicants
Violation of
Article 8 for one
applicant
No violation of
Art. 8

6
7

Y.T. v. Bulgaria
X. v. Former
Yugoslav
Republic of
Macedonia

8

S. V. v. Italy

9

Goucha v.
Portugal
Travas v.
Croatia

10

11

S.H. v. Austria

12

Orlandi v. Italy
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Art. 8

No violation of
Art. 8

Art. 8

No violation of
Art. 8

ADF International
ADF International
Alliance Defending
Freedom

Art. 8
Art. 8

Violation of Art. 8
Violation of Art. 8

Alliance Defending
Freedom
Alliance Defending
Freedom
Alliance Defending
European Centre
for Law and Justice
European Centre
for Law and Justice
Alliance Defending
Freedom
European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 8

Violation of Art. 8

Art. 8

No violation of
Art. 8
No violation of
Art. 8

Art. 8

Art. 8
Art. 8

No violation of
Art. 8
Violation of Art. 8

1365

Christian Faith-Based Organizations

13

Parillo v. Italy

14

A.K. v. Latvia
(G.C)
Martínez v.
Spain (G.C)

15

European Centre
for Law and Justice
Movimento per la
Vita
European Centre
for Law and Justice
European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 8

No violation of
Art. 8

Art. 8

Violation of Art. 8

Art. 8

No violation of
Art. 8
Strike the
application out of
list of cases
No violation of
Art.8 for two
applicants
Violation of Art. 8
for the third
applicant
Violation of Art. 8

16

Cassar v. Malta

European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 8

17

A, B & C v.
Ireland

European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 8

18

Costa & Pavan
v. Italy

European Centre
for Law and Justice
Movimento per la
Vita

Art. 8

19

Gross v.
Switzerland
(G.C)

Alliance Defending
Freedom
European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 2
Art. 8
Art. 35

Abuse of the right
of petition

20

X v. Austria
(G.C)

Alliance Defending
Freedom
European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 14
Art. 8

Violation of Art.
14, in conjunction
with
Article 8 (an
unmarried
different-sex
couple)
No violation of
Art. 14, in
conjunction with
Article 8 (married
couple)

21

P. & S. v. Poland

European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 8
Art. 3

Violation of Art. 8
Violation of Art. 3
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22

A.A. v.
Switzerland

ADF International

Art. 3

Violation of Art. 3

23

A. v.
Switzerland

ADF International

Art. 2
and
Art. 3

No violation of
Art. 2 and Art. 3

24

F. G. v. Sweden

Art. 2
Art. 3

No violation of
Art. 2
Violation of Art. 3

25

O’Keeffe v.
Ireland
M. B. v. Turkey

Alliance Defending
Freedom
European Centre
for Law and Justice
European Centre
for Law and Justice
European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 3

Violation of Art. 3

Art. 3

Violation of Art. 3

26
27

W.K & M.F. v.
Sweden

European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 3

28

A.R.M. v. Bosnia
& Herzegovina

European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 3

Application
inadmissible

29

R.B.G. v. Turkey

Art. 3

30

Alekhina v.
Russia

European Centre
for Law and Justice
Alliance Defending
Freedom

Not found in
HUDOC
Violation of Art. 3
Violation of Art.
10

31

Annen v.
Germany

Art. 10

Violation of Art.
10

32

Religious
Community of
Jehovah’s
Witnesses v.
Azerbaijan
E.S. v. Austria

ADF International
Alliance Defending
Freedom
European Centre
for Law and Justice
ADF International
Alliance Defending
Freedom

Art. 10

Violation of Art.
10

European Centre
for Law and Justice
ADF International
Alliance Defending
Freedom
European Centre
for Law and Justice
Alliance Defending
Freedom

Art. 10
Art. 9

No violation of
Art. 10
Violation of Art. 9

Art. 9

Violation of Art. 9

33
34

Papavasilakis v.
Greece

35

Eweida v.
United Kingdom
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Art. 3
Art. 10
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36

Mammadov v.
Azerbaijan

ADF International
Alliance Defending
Freedom
Alliance Defending
Freedom

Art. 9

Violation of Art. 9

37

Nagy v.
Hungary (G.C)

Art. 9
Art. 6.1

Application
inadmissible

38

Asociación de
Abogados
Cristianos
contre l’Espagne

European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 9
Art. 8

Pending

39

Sindicatul
“Pastorul Cel
Bun” v. Romania

European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 11

No violation of
Art. 11

40

Shioshvili v.
Russia
Herrmann v.
Germany

42

Lautsi v. Italy
(G.C)
B.B contra la
Pologne

European Centre
for Law and Justice
European Centre
for Law and Justice

Art. 2 of
Protocol
4
Art. 1 of
Protocol
No. 1
P 1- 2

Violation of Art. 2
of Protovol No. 4

41

ADF International
Alliance Defending
Freedom
European Centre
for Law and Justice

Teliatnikov
contre Lituanie

European Centre
for Law and Justice

43
44

Violation of Art. 1

No violation of
P1–2
Not delivered yet

Sources: HUDOC Database (https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/), European
Center for Law & Justice (https://eclj.org/), ADF International
(https://adfinternational.org/), and Alliance Defending Freedom
(https://adflegal.org/).
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